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The Scottish coalition 
agreement
by Philip Goldenberg
The first Scottish parliamentary elections in May this year were 
followed by a landmark coalition agreement between the Scottish 
Labour Party and the Scottish Liberal Democrats. Philip 
Goldenberg was involved in the drafting of wording on which Part 
III of the agreement was based and here analyses the significance 
of the Partnership Executive.
Ph,l,p Coldenbey
I n the words of Disraeli's well-known aphorism, 'England does not like coalitions'. Scotland would appear to be different! Opinion poll evidence suggests that the formation 
of the 'Partnership Executive' following the first Scottish 
parliamentary elections last May has been welcomed   at least 
so far   as a constructive attempt to work across party 
boundaries.
At the time of such formation, journalistic commentary 
focused almost exclusively (and not unreasonably) on the policy 
content of the agreement between the Scottish Labour Party and 
the Scottish Liberal Democrats, with particular reference to the 
issue of tuition fees. This latter, to which reference is made 
below, was dealt with by establishing an independent Committee 
of Inquiry with both political parties free to submit evidence 
independently.
What escaped journalistic attention was Part III of the 
agreement, which is reproduced in the text-box accompanying 
this article. This contained the structural provisions of the 
agreement and constitutes the only recent UK example of a 
formal arrangement for a full-blown coalition. The purpose of 
this article is to analyse it.
FORMS OF POLITICAL CO-OPERATION
First some background. There is a kaleidoscopic variety of 
ways in which political parties can co-operate together in 
sustaining an administration   the background circumstances 
and the parliamentary arithmetic being obviously important 
factors on each occasion.
For example, in March 1974 the then Liberal Party declined 
an offer from Ted Heath to join a Conservative-led coalition 
government, principally for three reasons:
(a) it would not have had a Parliamentary majority;
(b) the Conservative Party indicated that it was not prepared to 
make any significant policy changes, so that effectively the 
Liberal Party would have joined a Conservative
Government and been in what one might term the 'reverse 
harlot position', with total (collective) responsibility and no 
power; and
(c) while it might have been unclear who had won the 
February 1974 General Election, it was abundantly clear 
that the Conservative Party, having called that election 
while in possession of an overall majority, had lost it.
In 1977, the then Labour Government, having lost its 
(previously very narrow) overall majority, invited the then 
Liberal Party to enter into a parliamentary arrangement to 
support the government from the opposition benches in return 
for rights of consultation. One key objective of the Liberal Party 
  to obtain proportional representation for the forthcoming 
first elections to the European Parliament   failed because of 
inadequate support from Labour back-benchers; this 
demonstrated the need for any co-operation arrangement to 
have the support of both parliamentary parties, and not merely 
of the government as such.
Twenty years later, the Blair Government, although elected on 
a landslide majority, wished to bring the Liberal Democrats into 
a co-operative arrangement in relation to the programme of 
constitutional reform which they had jointly agreed in what 
became known as the Cook-Maclennan Agreement. Learning 
from experience, the Liberal Democrats had decided in advance 
that they would not be prepared to accept a Heath-type offer of 
minority participation in a Labour Government; had the 
parliamentary arithmetic been different, they might well have 
considered participation in a coalition government (this 
distinction is not merely semantic, and is discussed below). 
Instead, they suggested a Joint Cabinet Committee which would 
enable them to co-operate in a defined area of policy while 
retaining their independence on other topics. Nor, incidentally, 
was this device without precedent. For example:
(a) in 1905, members of the outgoing Conservative 
Government remained on the Committee for Imperial 
Defence; and
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(b) as recently as the late 1940s (and no doubt influenced by 
the National Government which had conducted the Second 
World War), the Attlee Government invited senior 
Conservatives to serve on a Joint Cabinet Committee on 
Defence.
SCOTLAND 1999
The first Scottish parliamentary elections in modern times 
produced a parliamentary situation of no overall majority. On 
the arithmetic, and also in terms of political compatibility (not 
least against the background not only of Westminster co- 
operation between New Labour and the Liberal Democrats but 
also of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which was the 
Scottish Parliament's midwife), a coalition between the Scottish
Labour Party and the Scottish Liberal Democrats made natural 
sense if it could be achieved.
Thus was born the Scottish Partnership Executive. Perhaps to 
the surprise of the Scottish Labour Party, the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats required, as a price for their support, not only a full 
and lengthy agreement on policy, but also a genuine coalition 
structure. The latter was achieved by Part III of the Scottish 
Coalition Agreement (set out in the accompanying text-box).
The Partnership Agreement adopts, and spells out at length, 
the doctrine of collective responsibility. However, in the nature 
of a coalition government, this is extended to reflect the fact that 
there will be mechanisms for resolving disputes. The normal 
such mechanism is a Coalition Committee which has equal 
representation from each of the coalition partners (regardless of
THE SCOTTISH COALITION AGREEMENT
(extract) 
Part III: Working Together
Introduction
To work effectively and deliver their programme the partners 
will need goodwill, mutual trust and agreed procedures which 
foster collective decision-making and responsibility while 
respecting each party's identity.
We are agreed that close consultation between the First 
Minister and the Deputy First Minister will be the foundation 
of the Partnership's success. Consultation needs to cover all 
aspects of the conduct of the Executive's business, including 
the allocation of responsibilities, the Executive's policy and 
legislative programme, the conduct of its business and the 
resolution of disputes.
Collective responsibility
Collective responsibility is accepted by the partners to mean 
that:
(a) all the business of the Executive, including decisions, 
announcements, expenditure plans, proposed legislation 
and appointments, engages the collective responsibility of 
the Executive as a whole and must be handled with an 
appropriate degree of consultation and discussion so as to 
ensure the support of all Ministers;
(b) Ministers have the opportunity to express their views 
frankly as decisions are reached;
(c) opinions expressed and advice offered within the 
Executive remain private;
(d) decisions of the Executive are binding on and supported 
by all Ministers; and
(e) mechanisms for sharing information and resolving 
disputes are followed.
To achieve this the Executive will agree and publish formal 
documents setting out the principles of collective decision-
making and the procedures to be followed to promote the 
good conduct of business.
Portfolios
The allocation of portfolios between the partners will be 
agreed by the leaders of the partnership parties. Ministerial 
appointments will be made by the First Minister, following 
consultation with the Deputy First Minister.
The role of the Deputy First Minister
The parties agree that, subject to the approval of the 
Parliament, the Leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats 
should be nominated to hold the office of Deputy First 
Minister in the Partnership Executive.
It is essential that the Deputy First Minister is kept fully 
informed across the range of Executive business so that he can 
engage in any issue where he considers that appropriate. The 
procedures to be established for handling business within the 
Executive will require officials to copy all relevant material to 
the offices of the leaders of both parties in the Executive. The 
Deputy First Minister will have appropriate official, political 
and specialist support to enable him to discharge his role 
effectively.
The parties' support for the Executive in Parliament
The two parliamentary parties will operate in support of the 
Partnership Executive but each will make its own business 
management arrangements, including measures to ensure 
effective Party support for the Executive.
Duration and ratification of this agreement
The partners' objective is that this agreement will cover the 
four years of the first Scottish Parliament and to achieve this 
they will make every effort to resolve any disagreements which 
may arise and threaten its continued operation.
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their respective numerical parliamentary strengths), and indeed 
may include non-parliamentarians such as senior party officers. 
This is not a specific provision of the Scottish Agreement, but 
nor is it ruled out; there is merely a bland statement that the 
partners will 'make every effort to resolve any disagreements 
which may arise' and threaten continuing co-operation.
An interesting application of this will be what happens 
following the report of the Independent Committee of Inquiry 
on tuition fees. The policy section of the Coalition Agreement 
provides that there will be a collective discussion of the 
Partnership Executive's response to the Committee Inquiry, but 
that its Liberal Democrat members are not bound in advance. 
Logically, this must also be true of its Labour members! The 
realistic options in the event of disagreement are presumably the 
break-up of the Partnership Executive or an abandonment of 
collective responsibility on this one issue.
DEPUTY FIRST MINISTER
The key to the functioning of the Partnership Executive is the 
role of the Deputy First Minister. The agreement states that 
'close consultation' between the First Minister and the Deputy 
First Minister will be 'the foundation of the Partnership's 
success', and goes on to provide that consultation needs to cover 
all aspects of the conduct of the Executive's business, including 
the allocation of responsibilities, the Executive's policy and 
legislative programme, the conduct of its business and the 
resolution of disputes. Specifically, it is agreed that the allocation 
of portfolios is a matter for agreement between them, and that 
ministerial appointments, while made by the First Minister, will 
be the subject of consultation with the Deputy First Minister.
As an exemplar of this, the Deputy First Minister has full 
access to all the First Minister's papers. He is to be kept 'fully 
informed' across the range of Executive business, so that he cano
engage in any issue he considers appropriate. Indeed, it is 
specifically provided that he will have his own office and staff (in 
the language of the Agreement, 'appropriate official, political and 
specialist support to enable him to discharge his role effectively').
This demonstrates that participation by the Liberal Democrats 
as minority partners in the Executive is no mere bolt-on, as was 
offered by Ted Heath in 1974 (but rejected), and rejected again 
by the Liberal Democrats in their pre-1997 General Election 
contingency planning for a 'hung Parliament'. Emphatically, the 
Partnership Executive is nor a Scottish Labour Government 
pursuing a Labour agenda but with Liberal Democrat 
participation; it is a genuine coalition government in terms of 
both policy and operation.
PARLIAMENTARY MANAGEMENT
Learning from their 1977/8 experience under the Lib-Lab 
Pact, the Liberal Democrats insisted that both political parties 
would be whipped in support of the Partnership Executive, 
although each would make its own business management 
arrangements, the latter to include measures to ensure 'effective 
Party support' for the Executive. Presumably the last point is a 
message directed to Old Labour elements in the Scottish Labour 
Party and to any Liberal Democrats who might be less than 
enthusiastic about co-operation with the Labour Party
Significantly, one of the four ministerial posts (two in the 
Executive, two outside) which the Liberal Democrats took was
that of Deputy Business Manager, thereby reinforcing both their 
influence on the Executive's business programme and their 
shared responsibility for its management.
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CONCLUSION
In a very British way, the UK, as a result of the programme of 
constitutional reform agreed between the Labour Government 
and the Liberal Democrats, is moving sideways towards a written 
constitution. Devolution to Scotland and Wales; the reform 
(however half-hearted) of the House of Lords; the establishment 
of a mayor and strategic authority for London; the creation of 
regional development authorities which will surely over a period, 
albeit perhaps not all at once, be given democratic legitimisation 
by an electoral process; the extension and increasing use of 
judicial review; whatever emerges in institutional terms from the 
Northern Ireland peace process; the accession of the UK to the 
European Contention on Afuman Rj^nr.?; and an (however inadequate 
and watered-down) Freedom of Information Act   the combined 
effect is a fundamental reshaping of British institutions, with a 
plethora of legal consequences. No longer will it be possible to 
say as Jim Callaghan is reputed to have observed, that 'The 
British constitution is what happens'. Instead, there is a gradual 
infusion of the rule of law into areas previously governed by ill- 
defined usage and convention.
Nor is it sensible to imagine that the process is concluded. The 
'West Lothian Question' (the concomitant inability of English 
MPs to vote on devolved Scottish and Welsh (and eventually 
Northern Irish) matters, while MPs from these areas can vote on 
English matters) remains unresolved, and will only be answered 
by the adoption of a proper federal structure. This in turn will fit 
well with the future development of the European Union into an 
Europe & Region; rather than one composed of nation states.
In addition, with proportional representation in place for all 
non-Westminster elections in Northern Ireland, for the new 
authorities in Scotland, Wales and London, for European 
parliamentary elections, and likely to be adopted for Scottish 
local elections and perhaps also for local elections in England and 
Wales, its tide, already lapping around the ramparts of 
Westminster, will surely eventually break through there too. This 
will inevitably mean that, whatever Disraeli may have thought, 
coalition government at Westminster may become the norm 
rather than the exception; and Scotland will have provided the 
test-bed. @
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As a Liberal Democrat Philip GolJenherg was involved, in the run-up 
to the 1997 General Election, in that party's contingency planning for 
co-operation \vith the Lahour Party on a spectrum from a full-blown 
coalition to the Joint Cabinet Committee, which he conceived and 
which subsequently became a reality. The wording of Part HI of the 
Scottish Coalition Agreement was based on his original contingency 
drafting for Westminster.
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